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LAW CLERK 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 01: THE STATE OF IDAHO 
VOLUME ONE OF ONE 
CASE NO. 36540-2009 
BRITT G. BURTON 
Petitioner-Appellant 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Respondent-Respondent 
Appealed from the District Court of the 
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
In and for the County of Benewah. 
Honorable FRED M. GIBLER, 
Judge 
JAMES E. SIEBE .... .. . - .*. . . .-._.. -- - 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
P.O. Box 9045 
Moscow, ID 83843 
SUSAN K. SERVICK 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent-Respondent 
P.O. Box 2900 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16 
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New Case Filed - Other Claims Fred M. Gibler 
Filing: G3 - All Other Actions Or Petitions, Not Fred M. Gibler 
Demanding $ Amounts Paid by: James E. Siebe 
Receipt number: 00031 02 Dated: 912712007 
Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Burton, Britt Colleen 
(plaintiff) 
Plaintiff: Burton, Britt Colleen Appearance James Fred M. Gibler 
E Siebe 
Petition For Judicial Review Fred M. Gibler 
Exparte Petition For Stay Pending Judicial Review Fred M. Gibler 
Exparte Order For Stay Pending Judicial Review Fred M. Gibler 
Administrative Record For Judicial Review Fred M. Gibler 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 12/07/2007 10:30 Fred M. Gibler 
AM) RE: Petition for Judicial Review 
Notice Of Hearing Fred M. Gibler 
Notice of Petitioner's Request For Preparation Of Fred M. Gibler 
Transcript 
Filing: U - Miscellaneous Fees Use Miscellaneous Fred M. Gibler 
Schedule!!!!! Paid by: Rami Amaro Receipt 
number: 0003599 Dated: 1111 312007 Amount: 
$.00 (Cash) For: State of ldaho Transportation 
Department (defendan 
Defendant: State of Idaho Transportation Fred M. Gibler 
Department Appearance Rami Amaro 
Notice Of Appearance Fred M. Gibler 
Supplemental Aency Record Fred M. Gibler 
Second Supplemental Agency Record Fred M. Gibler 
Motion To Vacate December 7, 2007 Status Fred M. Gibler 
Conference And Set Briefing Schedule 
Hearing result for Status held on 12/07/2007 Fred M. Gibler 
10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated RE: Petition for 
Judicial Review 
Order Vacating December 7,2007 Status Fred M. Gibler 
Conference And Setting Briefing Schedule 
Petitioner's Brief Fred M. Gibler 
Stipulated Motion To Extend Time For Response Fred M. Gibler 
And Reply Briefs Pursuant To I.A.R. 34e 
Order Granting Stipulated Motion To Extend Time Fred M. Gibler 
For Response And Reply Briefs Pursuant To 
I.A.R. 34c 
Respondent's Brief Fred M. Gibler 
Petitioner's Reply Brief Fred M. Gibler 
Petition For Scheduling Of Oral Argument Fred M. Gibler 
t3ate. 512912009 First Judicial Clistrict Court - Benewah County User CAROL 
Nme 10.24 AM ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000461 Current Judge: Fred M. Gibler 
Britt Colleen Burton vs. State of ldaho Transportation Department 
@3ritt Colleen Burton vs. State of ldaho Transportation Department 
fij 
Date Code User Judge 
1012008 HRSC CAROL Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Fred M. Gibler 
1011 712008 02:OO PM) Oral Argument 





Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Fred M. Gibler 
1011 712008 02:OO PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Fred M. Gibler 
01/16/2009 1 1:00 AM) Oral Argument 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Fred M. Gibler 
0311312008 01:OO PM) Oral Argument on Appeal 
(Rami Amaro to notice hearing) 
Notice Of Hearing (Oral Argument) Fred M. Gibler 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Status Hearing date: Fred M. Gibler 
311 312009 Time: 1 :00 pm 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Fred M. Gibler 
0311 312009 01 :00 PM: District Court Hearing Helc 
Court Reporter: Byrl Cinnamon 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages Oral Argument 
on Appeal (Rami Amaro to notice hearing) 
Opinion & Order RE: Appeal Fred M. Gibler 
Civil Disposition entered for: State of Idaho Fred M. Gibler 
Transportation Department, Defendant; Burton, 
Britt Colleen, Plaintiff. Filing date: 411312009 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed Fred M. Gibler 
Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel Fred M. Gibler 
Defendant: State of Idaho Transportation Fred M. Gibler 
Department Appearance Susan K Servick 
Miscellaneous Payment: Supreme Court Appeal Fred M. Gibler 
Fee (Please insert case #) Paid by: James E. 
Siebe Receipt number: 0004728 Dated: 
5/26/2009 Amount: $86.00 (Check) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 4729 Dated Fred M. Gibler 
5/26/2009 for 100.00) 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Fred M. Gibler 
action 
Notice of Appeal Lodged ($15.00 filing fee has Fred M. Gibler 
not been received) 
Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal Fred M. Gibler 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Fred M. Gibler 
Appeal Filed In District Court Fred M. Gibler 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court Fred M. Gibler 
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via 
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District 
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: Siebe, 
James E (attorney for Burton, Britt Colleen) 
Receipt number: 0004741 Dated: 5/27/2009 






























SIEBE LAW OFFICES 
J A m S  E. SIEBE, ISBN 2362 
202 E. Second Street 
P.O. Box 9045 
Moscotv, ID 83843 
Telephone: (208) 883-0622 
Facsimile: (208) 882-8769 
IN DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
BI-UTT COLLEEN BURTON, 1 
1 Case No. C, \/ Q 7 - c/ c, / 
Petitioner, 1 
1 ITD File No. 384000014306 
v. Idaho D.L. No. RA355028A 
STATE OF IDAHO, PETITION FOR 
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, JUDICIAL E V I E W  
Respondent. ) Fee Category: C3 
Fee: $88.00 
COMES NOW, Petitioner Britt Colleen Burton, by and through her attorney of 
record, James E. Siebe, of Moscow, Idaho, and pursuant to I.C. $8 18-8002A(8) and 67- 
5270 et seq., hereby respectfully petitions this Court for Judicial Review of the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order dated September 20,2007, by the Idaho 
Department of Transportation, in File No. 384000014306. A copy of said final order is 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. Said proceeding and final order were entered following a 
hearing held pursuant to 1.C. 9 1 8-8002A. 
DATED this day of September, 2007. 
SIEBE LAW OFFICES A 
CERTIFICATE A E-S d RVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ay of September, 2007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing the following method, addressed to the 
following: 
Driver Services U.S. Mail 
Idaho Transportation Dept. Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 7 129 
Boise, ID 83707-1 129 
(208) 334-8739 
(208) 332-2002 
Hon. Fred M. Cibler 
P.O. Box 527 
Wallace, ID 83873 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
/ ernight Mail Facsimile 
(208) 753-3581 
I N  THE IDAHO TRANSPOWATION DEPARTMENT 
$53 
$85 




IN THE MATTER OF THE ) IDAHO DL. N0.RA355028A 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF ) FILE M0.384000014306 
) 
This matter came on for hearing on September 17, 2007, by 
telephone conference. James Siebe, Attorney at  Law, represented Burton. 
The suspension set out in the Notice of Suspension served 
pursuant to Idaho Code 518-8002~ '  is SUSTAINED. 
EXHIBIT  LIST^ 
The hearing examiner received the following exhibits into evidence 
as part of the record of the proceeding: 
1. Notice of suspension and temporary permit 
2. Evidentiary test results 
3. Sworn statement 
4. Incident summary 
5. Incident report 
6. Copy of citation number 14306 
7. Teletype records 
8. Copy of petitioner's driver's license 
9. Envelope from law enforcement agency 
Exhibit A 
Page 1 of 10 
1O.Ceeificate of receipt of law enforcement documents 
11 .Petitioner's hearing request 
12. Petitioner's driving record 
13.Response to discovery 
A. Motion to suppress 
B. Memorandum in support of motion to  suppress 
The Hearing Examiner has taken Judicial Notice of the 
following Items: 
1. Records regularly maintained by ITD 
2. IDAPA* Rules and manuals 
3. ISP§ standards and procedures" for breath testing instruments 
4. Idaho Statutes 
5. Reported Court Decisions 
6. NHTSA" driving while impaired and SFSTS** testing manual (9/04) 
Administrative ~ r o c e e d i n g s ~ ~  
Ms. Burton testified : 
1. Read Officer Hilton's reason for the stop as noted i n  Exhibit 3. 
2. Officer Hilton stopped her vehicle while she was driving up a hill on a 
roadway. 
3. This section of a two-way roadway has a passing lane (left lane) and a 
right lane of travel. 
4. Her vehicle was being driven within the right lane of travel. 
5. While driving up the hill, there was traffic in  the oncoming lane of 
travel. 
6. A sign indicated the lanes were going to  merge. 
7. The sign only showed the lanes merging and did no t  state which lane 
would disappear. 
Exhibit A 
Page 2 of I 0  
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCI,USIONS OF T A W  AND O R D E R  - 2 
8. Not driving beyond the posted speed limit, did not weave the vehicle, 
and the vehicle's equipment was working before the stop occurred. 
9.  Informed the reason for the stop was the failure to  use the vehicle's 
turn signals when the two lanes of travel became one lane of travel. 
10 .The stop occurred after passing the lane merging sign. 
11.The vehicle's signals were no t  used after passing the sign. 
12.Did not  know she had to use the vehicfe's turn signal when merging 
into another lane of travel while driving up a hill. 
1J.Not turning the vehicle or turning off the roadway. 
Mr. Siebe's comments and arguments: 
1. Officer Hilton did not have legal cause for the stop. 
2. Officer Hilton did not cite a specific Idaho code. 
3. Assumes Officer Hilton was relying on Idaho Gode 549-808(1). 
4. Idaho Code 949-808(1) was read into the record. 
5. Idaho Code 949-808(1) is unconditionally vague. 
6. Idaho Gode 949-808(1) gives inadequate notice to people of  ordinary 
intelligence concerning the conduct that  this statute prescribes. 
7. This statute fails to give minimal guidelines for law enforcement or 
others that  enforce this Idaho Code. 
8. I n  this case, people of reasonable intelligence would not know a turn 
signal would be required. 
9. The passing lane disappears when the right lane and passing lane 
becomes one lane of travel. 
1O.A turn signal in  this case could be misconstrued and indicate that 
Burton was going to turn off the roadway. 
11.A roadway's lanes of travel when merging do not  require a turn signal. 
Exhibit A 
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I, having heard the testimony; having heard the issues raised by 
the driver; having considered the exhi bits admitted as evidence; having 
considered the matter herein; and being advised in the premises and the 
law, make the following Findings of Fact: 
1 
DID OFFICER HILTON HAVE LEGAL CAUSE TO STOP THE VEHICLE 
BURTON WAS DRIVING? 
1. Officer Hilton observed the vehicle driven by Burton fail to use the 
vehicle's turn signals when merging f rom lane of travel to another lane 
of travel as required by Idaho Code 549-808(1). 
2. Idaho Code 518-8002A(b)(ii) does not require a police officer to  state 
a specific Idaho code violation in their sworn statement when setting 
forth a legal cause to  stop a petitioner's vehicle. 
3. Exhibit 3 is sufficient pursuant to Idaho Code 518-8002A(S)(b)(ii) in  
describing Officer Hilton's legal cause for the stopping the vehicle 
Burton was driving. 
4. Legal issues such as those noted in Exhibits A and B are not one of the 
issues that an administrative license suspension (ALS) hearing officer 
can rule on as provided in Idaho Code 518-8002A(7) and supported by 
State vs. Kane (139 Idaho 586). 
5 .  Burton's ALS cannot be vacated based upon what was articulated in  
both Exhibits A and B. 
6. Officer Hilton had legal cause to  stop the vehicle driven by Burton. 
Exhibit A 
Page 4 of $0 
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DID OFFICER HILTON HAVE LEGAL CAUSE TO BELIEVE BURTON 
VIOLATED IDAHO CODE 518-8004? 
1. Officer Hilton observed Hilton driving a motor vehicle. 
2. Burton exhibited the following behaviors: 
a. Smelled of an alcoholic beverage 
b. Admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages 
c. Memory was impaired 
d. Eyes were glassy 
e. Eyes were bloodshot 
3. Burton met or exceeded the minimum decision points on the following 
SFSTs: 
a. The horizontal gaze nystagmus 
b. The 9-step walk and turn 
c. The one leg stand 
4. Officer Hilton had sufficient legal cause to arrest Burton and request an 
evidentiary test. 
3. 
DID THE EVIDENTIARY TEST RESULTS INDICATE A VIOLATION OF 
IDAHO CODE §§IS-8004,18-8004C, OR 18-8006? 
1. The analyses of Burton's breath samples indicated a BrAC.** of 
.156/. 152. 
2. Burton was in violation of Idaho Code 918-8004. 
Exhibit A 
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4. 
WAS THE EVIDENTIARY TEST PERFORMED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL 
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN IDAHO CODE, IDAPA RULE, AND I S P  
FORENSIC SERVICES SOP? 
1. Officer Hilton's affidavit states the evidentiary test was performed in 
compliance with Idaho Code, IDAPA Rule, and ISP Forensic Services 
SOP. 
2. Burton's evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho 
Code, IDAPA Rule, and ISP Forensic Services SOP. 
5. 
DID THE EVIDENTIARY TESTING INSTRUMENT FUNCTION PROPERLY 
WHEN THE TEST WAS ADMINISTERED? 
1. The evidentiary testing instrument used to test Burton's breath sample 
completed a valid simulator solution check at 03:49 hours on August 
26, 2007. 
2. The valid simulator solution check approved the instrument for 
evidentiary testing in accordance with ISP Forensic Services SOP. 
3. The evidentiary testing instrument functioned properly when the test 
was administered. 
6. 
WAS BURTON ADVISED OF THE POSSIBLE SUSPENSION OF HER 
IDAHO DRIVING PRIVILEGE? 
1. Burton was played the audiotape version of the Idaho Code 5518-8002 
and 18-8002A advisory form prior to Burton submitting to the 
evidentiary test. 
2. Burton was advised of the consequences of refusing or  failing 
evidentiary testing as required by Idaho Code 5518-8002 and 18- 
8002A. 
Exhibit A 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAVJ APdD C)RnER - 6 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
CONFLICTING FACTS, I F  ANY, WERE CONSIDERED AND 
REJECTED I N  FAVOR OF THE FOREGOING CITED FACTS. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, I 
CONCLUDE THAT ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES 
SET FORTH I N  IDAHO CODE fjfj18-8002 AND 18-8002A 
WERE COMPLIED WITH I N  THIS CASE. 
THE FOLLOWING ORDER I S  RENDERED: 
The suspension s e t  out in t h e  Not ice  of Suspension served 
pursuant to I d a h o  Code 918-8002A i s  SUSTAINED a n d  
shall run for a per iod  of ONE YEAR commencing on 
September 25, 2007, and  remain  in ef fect  through 
September 25, 2008. 
DATED this 2oth day of September 2007. 
Exhibit A 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS O F  LAW AND ORDER - 7 
P -  lt 
Endnotes 
" Idaho's Implied Consent Statute 
t Idaho Transpoflation Department's (ITD hereafter) exhibits are numeric, 
Petitioner's exhibits are alpha * Idaho's Administrative Procedure Act 
Idaho State Police 
" Hereafter SOP 
" National Highway Transportation Administration 
" Standardized field sobriety tests 
§§ Argument and testimony is summarized from record of hearing *** 
Breath Alcohol Concentration 
Exhibit A 
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FINAL ORDER 
(Hearings pursuant to section 18-8002A, I.C.) 
This is a final order of the Department. 
A motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Idaho 
Transportation Department's Administrative License Suspension 
Hearing Unit, PO Box 7129, Boise, I D  83707-1129 within fourteen 
(14) days of the issue date of this order. I f  the hearing officer fails to 
act upon this motion within twenty-one (21) days of its receipt, the 
motion will be deemed denied. 
Or, pursuant to sections 67-5270 and 67-5272, Idaho code, any party 
aggrieved by this final order or orders previously issued in this case 
may appeal this final order and al l  previously issued orders in this case 
to district court by filing a petition for judicial review in the district 
court of the county in which: 
1. A hearing was held; 
2. The final agency actions were taken; or 
3. The party seeking review of the order resides. 
An appeal must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the issue date 
of this final order. The filing of an appeal to district court does not 
itself stay the effectiveness or enforcement of the order under appeal. 
Exhibit A 
Page 9 of 10 
Pie / 2  
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h & a d a y  of September 2007, I mailed 
a true and accurate copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER by depositing the same in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
lames E. Siebe 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 9045 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Exhibit A 
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IV, ~ i s f ~ u u r  1 3  ul t-8,X 208 E67 R992 A M A R O  LAW OFFICE @001/0113 
0 
Special Deputy Attomey General 
ISBA #5848 
Attomey for Respondent - Idaho Tran~iportation Depmen t  
IN THEi DISTNCT COURT OF THE FIRST JULlTCIAL DISWCT OF 
TEE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAHT 
Appeltant, 
V. 
Case No. CV-07-461 





COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, Transportation Department 
(hereinafter "Respondent'?, by and through its attorney, W I  AMARO of the AMARO 
LAW OFFICE, Special Deputy Attorney General, and files with this Court a 
supplemental document recently added to the Agency Record. This document consists of 
the court reporter's estimate to prepare a transcript of the adminisrative proceeding. 
Petirioner has fourteen ( 14) days from the date CI f f iling this estimate w ithin which to 
object to or otherwise request additions to the Agency Record. If no objection is made or 
addition requested, the record shall be deemed complete and settled as of the foutteenth 
( 1 4 ~ )  day after the filing of this estimate. The Petitiancr's brief shall then be due thirty- 
five (35) days later and Respondent's brief shall bc duc twenty-eight (28) days after 
r u / r 8 / z u u f  i 3 : O Z  FAX 208 667 9992 A N A R O  LAW OFFICE @ 002/003  
receipt of Petitions's brief, 
I hereby certify that, to the best of my bowledge and belief, the enclosd document 
is true and comect, and Wt, toge&er with the original Agency Record fiIed in this tnatter, 
thc Agency Record filed with this Court is complete. The Department has retained the 
original file. 
The following is a listing of the docments constituting the supplement to the 
Agency Record: 
1. Transcript costs for heasing on September 17,2007. 
DATED this \ day of October 2007. 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
SUPPLEMEWL AGENCY RECORD-2. 
S:\Staxc of IdahoiBumn\P)cadings\Svpplmd Agmy Record (2007 10 09-nd).doc 
I V C  I C ) / F V U ~  1 3  u 1  P A X  208 657 a992 A M A R O  LAW OFFICE @ 0 0 3 / 0 0 3  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEReBY CERTIPi that on the day of October 2007, 1 caused to be 
sewed a true and correct copy of the foregomg by thc method indicated below, and 
Adressed to the following: 
James Siebe 
Attorney at Law 
P.Q. Box 9045 
Moscow, Idaho $3843 
U.S. Mail 
Overnight Delivery 
- iiand Delivered 
-- q- Facsimile (208) & - 87q 
Paralegal to Rami Amaro 
SUPPLEMEFITAL AGENCY RECORD -3. 
S:\SBic of i&ho\Bunon\Plcadmqplmtai  Agency Record (2007 10 09-nd).doc 
-f ltEO 
RAM1 ANARO BENEWH COUNTY J r"r!CHEtE FiEYHtft^BSv CLERh 
Specla1 Deputy Attorney General 
P.0, Box 796 2807  NO^( 28 bkf \@: S L  
Hayden, Idaho 83835 
Telephone: (208) 6651755 1 
Facsimile: (208) 667-9992 
ISBA #5848 
Attorney for Respondent - Idaho Transportation Department 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAHI 




AGENCY RECORD , 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent, 
COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, Transportation Department 
(hereinafter "Respondent"), by and through its attorney, RAM1 AMARO of the AMARO 
LAW OFFICE, Special Deputy Attorney General, and files with this Court a 
supplemental document recently added to the Agency Record. This document consists of 
the transcript of hearing on September 17, 2007. Petitioner has fourteen (14) days from 
the date of filing this transcript within which to object to or otherwise request additions to 
the Agency Record. If no objection is made or addition requested, the record shall be 
deemed complete and settled as of the fourteenth ( 1 4 ~ ~ )  day after the filing of this 
estimate. The Petitioner's brief shall then be due thirty-five (35) days later and 
Respondent's brief shall be due twenty-eight (28) days after receipt of Petitioner's brief. 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AGENCY RECORD- 1. 
S:\State of Idaho\Burton\Pleadings\Suppletnental Agency Record (2007 10 09--nd).doc 
I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the enclosed document 
is truc and correct, and that, together with the original Agency Record filed in this matter, 
the Agency Record filed with t h~s  Court is complete. The Depadment has retained the 
original file. 
Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of the transcript for hearing on September 17, 
DATED this 'Q day of November, 2007. 
AMARO LAW OFFICE 
I 
-MI AMARO 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AGENCY RECORD-2. 
S:\State of Idaho\BurtonWleadings\Supplemental Agency Record (2007 10 09--nd).doc 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Qo day of November 2007, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
James Siebe 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9045 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
)e U.S. Mail 
Overnight Delivery 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 883-0622 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AGENCY RECORD-3. 
S:\State of Idaho\BurtonWleadings\Supplemental Agency Record (2007 10 09--nd).doc 
COPY 
I 
A P P E A R A N C E S  
F o r  M s .  B u r t o n :  JAMES E. S IEBE,  E s q .  
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P o s t  O f f i c e  B o x  9 0 4 5  
Moscow, Idaho 8 3 8 4 3  
I N D E X  
WITNESS EXAMINATION BY PAGE 
B r i t t  C o l l e e n  B u r t o n  S w o r n  6 
( P e t i t i o n e r )  M r .  Siebe ( D i r e c t )  7  
HEDRICK COURT REPORTING 
P.  0. BOX 5 7 8 ,  BOISE, I D  8 3 7 0 1  
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17 ,  2007 
I 
HEARING OFFICER:  O k a y ,  i t  i s  recording. I ' m  
going t o  w o r k  n o w .  O k a y ?  
MR. S I E B E :  O k a y .  
HEARING OFFICER:  O k a y ,  I ' l l  go ahead and 
t r ans fe r  her .  I ' l l  c a l l  her .  O k a y ?  
. S I E B E :  A l l  r i g h t .  
( T e l e p h o n e  sounds.} 
i 
HqARING OFFICER:  A r e  you there, J i m ?  
M I .  S I E B E :  Y e s .  
H ~ A R I N G  OFFICER:  O k a y .  
J ( T e l e p h o n e  sounds.)  M . BURTON: H e l l o ?  
HEARING OFFICER:  Is t h i s  B r i t t  B u r t o n ?  
MS. BURTON: Y e s ,  it is.  
HEARING OFFICER:  H i .  T h i s  i s  E r i c  Moody, t h e  
hear ing  off icer .  Y o u r  a t t o r n e y ,  M r .  J i m  Siebe, i s  on t h e  other  
l i n e .  
C a n  you hear her ,  M r .  Siebe? 
MR. S I E B E :  Y e s ,  I can. 
HEARING OFFICER:  A n d ,  M s .  B u r t o n ,  can you hear 
your  a t to rney?  
M S .  BURTON: Y e s ,  I can. 
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WEARING OFFICER: All right. I ' m  going to 90 
ahead and begin. Is she going to be testifying today, 
Mr. Siebe? 
MR. SIEBE: Yes, she is. 
HEARING OFFICER: All right. 
The time is 1:08 Mountain time. The date is 
September 17th, the year 2007. This is the date and time set 
for the Britt Colleen Burton administrative hearing, ID No. 
RP1355028A, and date of birth is 3/31/72. 
My name is Eric Moody, and I've been appointed by 
the Department to hear this matter. 
This hearing will be conducted by telephone 
conference call as permitted by the Rules and Regulations of 
the Idaho Transportation Department and the laws of Idaho. 
The hearing is being recorded. 
The driver is present; also, her attorney, 
James Siebe. 
This hearing is being conducted at the driver's 
request in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedures 
Act and the Idaho Attorney General's procedure (sic). 
Statute sets forth specific issues that can be 
raised at these hearings, and the burden of proof is upon the 
driver as to any issue that is raised. 
Mr. Siebe, I have received from the State 
Transportation Department exhibits that were marked 1 through 
4 
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13. Did you receive these exhibits? 
MR. SIEBE: Yes, I did. 
HEARING OFFICER: Will you be providing any 
exhibits into the record? 
MR. SIEBE: Yes. I'm going to have my office fax 
a copy of a Brief and Motion, if I could have them marked -- if 
I could just mark those and fax them after this hearing as 
Exhibits 1 and 2. Do you want them without the alphabetical -- 
letters on them? 
HEARING OFFICER: They'll be alphabet -- 
MR. SIEBE: Okay. 
HEARING OFFICER: -- but let our department mark 
them. Okay? 
MR. SIEBE: A and B then? 
HEARING OFFICER: Yes. 
MR. SIEBE: Okay. And that would be a Motion to 
Dismiss or Suppress and a Brief in support of that that we 
filed in the criminal case. Okay? 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. 
MR. SIEBE: And I'm in Coeur dtAlene, so I'll 
have to have people from Moscow send that to you. If you don't 
mind, give me a fax number to send it to. 
HEARING OFFICER: That fax number would be 
332-2002. 
MR. SIEBE: Okay. Great. I'll do that then. 
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HEARING OFFICER: Okay.  And t h a t  could be t a k e n  
c a r e  o f  a f t e r  t h e  h e a r i n g .  
MR. SIEBE: Sure .  
HEARING OFFICER: Those w i l l  become p a r t  o f  t h e  
r e c o r d .  
Also  f o r  your i n f o r m a t i o n ,  I do have t h e  o r i g i n a  
e x h i b i t s  t h e  law enforcement  agency i s  t o  p r o v i d e  p u r s u a n t  t o  
S t a t u t e .  And a g a i n ,  b e f o r e  I r e n d e r  a Decis ion ,  I ' l l  make s u r  
t h o s e  e x h i b i t s  were s u b m i t t e d  i n  compliance w i t h  Idaho Code an1 
a l l  o r i g i n a l  e x h i b i t s  a s  r e q u i r e d  by S t a t u t e  were submi t t ed .  
Okay? 
MR. SIEBE: Okay. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. A t  t h i s  t i m e ,  I ' l l  go 
ahead and p l a c e  B r i t t  under  o a t h .  
BRITT COLLEEN BURTON, 
produced a s  a w i t n e s s  a t  t h e  i n s t a n c e  o f  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r ,  b e i n g  
f i r s t  d u l y  sworn, was examined and t e s t i f i e d  a s  fo l lows :  
HEARING OFFICER: A l l  r i g h t .  And y o u ' r e  g o i n g  t c  
have t o  speak  up j u s t  a l i t t l e  b i t  l o u d e r ,  make s u r e  I can hear  
you and r e c o r d  you, and a l s o  your  a t t o r n e y  can h e a r  you. Okay? 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
HEARING OFFICER: A l l  r i g h t .  
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SIEBE: 
Q. Yeah, this is a bad connection anyway Britt, so 
anyway, help us out if you don't mind, by speaking up. Okay? 
A. Okay. Sorry. 
Q. Would you tell us your full name, please? 
A. Britt Colleen Burton. 
Q. Will you spell your last name? 
A. B-U-R-T-0-N. 
Q. And where do you live? 
A. In Fernwood, Idaho. 
Q. Okay. Are you the Petitioner seeking to 
challenge the proposed suspension of your driving privileges i 
this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Now, have you had a chance to review the 
materials that we were sent by the Department of 
Transportation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So you had a chance to read the police 
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has those available, but for the record, we've -- 
acknowledged, those are Exhibit No. 3 which was attached to the 
packet we got from the Department of Transportation, and I 
furnished those to the -- to the Petitioner in this particular 
BY MR. SIEBE: Did you have a chance to read what 
the officer said relative to why he stopped you on the evening 
in question? 
Ms. Burton? Did you -- 
I'm here. 
Q. Did you -- did you have a -- can you hear me? 
A. Yeah, I can. (Inaudible. ) 
Q. Did you have a chance to read what the officer 
said was his reason for stopping you on the Probable Cause 
Affidavit ? 
A. Oh, because I did not signal while merging from a 
double to a single lane. 
Q. Okay. So the answer is, "Yes." 
A. Yes. 
Q. Sorry. You don't need to tell us what he said. 
I'm just trying to clarify some things preliminarily here, 
Britt. Okay? 
A. (Inaudible. ) 
Q. So, you read the Probable Cause Affidavit. 
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Okay. And at 2:36 in the morning, were you 
headed out of St. Maries on Highway 3? 
Okay. This was on the 26th of August? 
So you agree with the date the officer put on the 
Probable Cause document? 
Okay. And then why don't you describe for me 
where -- where it was that he pulled you over. He references 
milepost 81. Is that going up a hill? 
A. That's just before. I'm not exactly sure where 
milepost 81 is, but -- 
Q. Well, let's -- let's take a step back. Forget 
that I mentioned 81. The officer mentioned milepost 81, but if 
you don't know, that's fine. 
A. Okay. 
Q. You were pulled over as you were climbing a hill, 
coming away from St. Maries. Is that fair? 
A. Yes. 
Q- Okay.' And was there a passing lane going the 
same direction you were going, as well as a lane on the right 
of the passing lane? 
9 
A 
Which l a n e  were you i n ?  
I n  t h e  r i g h t .  
Okay. And were you speeding? 
Was your c a r  weaving i n  any way? 
Was your -- were a l l  t h e  -- was a l l  t h e  equipment 
on your c a r  o p e r a t i n g  proper ly?  
Okay. So -- and t h e  o f f i c e r  t o l d  you t h e  reason 
he p u l l e d  you over  was because you f a i l e d  t o  s i g n a l  when t h e  
two l a n e s  became one? 
A. Y e s .  
Q Okay. Now, t h i s  means t h a t  t h e  l e f t  l a n e  
d i sappeared .  Is t h a t  i t ?  
A. Y e s .  
Q. Okay. Now, going up t h e  h i l l  -- I d o n ' t  want t o  
be  l e a d i n g  you wi th  t h e s e  ques t ions ,  s o  l e t  m e  a sk  some 
ques t ions  where you g i v e  m e  t h e  answers -- was t h e r e  a s i g n  
i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  l a n e s  were going -- t h a t  t h e  l a n e s  were 
merging? 
A. Y e s .  
Q. Had you passed t h e  s i g n  be fo re  you a c t u a l l y  were 
stopped? 
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A. Wad I passed  t h e  s ign?  
Q. Yeah, t h e  s i g n  t h a t  says  t h e  l a n e s  were going t o  
be  merging, had you passed  t h a t  before  you were s topped? 
A. Y e s ,  I d i d .  Y e s .  
Q. Okay. And d i d  you s i g n a l  b e f o r e  you were -- 
b e f o r e  you -- o r ,  d i d  you s i g n a l  a s  you passed t h a t  s ign?  
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And you understand t h e  o f f i c e r  t o l d  you 
t h a t  he pu l l ed  you over  because you d i d n ' t  s i g n a l ?  
A. Cor rec t .  
Q. Okay. Now, d i d  you understand b e f o r e  t h i s  t h a t  
you were r equ i r ed  t o  s i g n a l  a t  a l l  before  o r  when a pass ing 
l a n e  d i sappears  and when you ' r e  i n  t h e  r igh t -hand  l a n e  going up 
a h i l l ?  
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And t h i s  i s  two-way t r a f f i c ,  was it not ,  
except  f o r  t h e  pas s ing  l a n e  and t h e  r ight-hand l a n e  going up 
t h e  h i l l ?  There was oncoming t r a f f i c  i n  t h e  o t h e r  l ane?  
A. Cor rec t .  
Q. Whether t h e r e  was t r a f f i c  t h a t  n i g h t  o r  not ,  t h e  
r o a d ' s  set up f o r  oncoming t r a f f i c .  Is t h a t  c o r r e c t ?  
A. Y e s .  
Q. Okay. Now, d i d  you a t  any t i m e  t u r n ?  
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Did you merge o r  e x i t  from t h e  highway? 
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YOU were already on the highway from the time You 
left St. Maries, I take it? 
Okay. And then did the sign tell you which lane 
disappeared or did it just show that the line -- that the -- 
the lanes merged? 
It just showed that the lanes merged. 
MR. SIEBE: No further questions. 
(The witness was excused.) 
HEARING OFFICER: Your arguments. 
MR. SIEBE: Yes. I -- I think there was 
insufficient cause to pull her over. 
The -- our position is he didn't cite a specific 
statute, but I'm assuming he was relying on Idaho Code 
49-808(1), which states that no person shall turn a vehicle 
onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a highway 
or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the 
movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving 
an appropriate signal. 
And it's our position that if that is the 
Statute, in fact, that was applied in this particular case, 
that the Statute is unconstitutionally vague. It fails to give 
any adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
12 - 
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concerning the conduct it prescribes, and fails to establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must 
enforce the Statute. 
From our perspective, drivers of reasonably or 
presmably ordinary intelligence would not understand the need 
to give a signal when all they're doing, as she did, is 
continuing straight when the, actually, the passing lane 
disappears even though both lanes become one. And, certainly, 
signaling could actually give the wrong impression that you 
were actually getting ready to leave the roadway when you're 
not. And there should be no need to signal when the highway 
leaves no choice whatsoever, no more than you would have to 
signal if a highway took a -- an angle off to the right or went 
around one of those, I don't know what -- how to describe them 
other than a roundy-round, but one of those go-arounds like 
they have in Europe and in New Zealand where you go around and 
then take one of the spikes or one of the streets that come off 
of a circular drive as you're going down the road. 
And from this perspective, given the totality of 
the circumstances, if that is why the officer pulled her 
over -- and he doesn't say in his -- in his report here, which 
I think is also fatal, you know, what he's relying on other 
than the fact that she didn't signal when the highway merged 
from two lanes to one -- that Statute's unconstitutional. But 
I think you could find this defective in terms of cause for 
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pulling her over by not articulating more specifically why it 
was he pulled her over. 
He observed no driving pattern other than this 
supposed failure to signal, and she's testified that there was 
nothing in her driving pattern independently that would warrant 
being pulled over. 
So, for that reason, we ask that you not sustain 
the suspension. 
HEARING OFFICER: Anything else? 
MR. SIEBE: No. 
HEARING OFFICER: With that, I'll review the 
record and I'll get a written Order of my Decision out to you 
in the mail. 
MR. SIEBE: Okay. Thank you. 
HEARING OFFICER: And could you hold on while 
the -- 
(The hearing concluded.) 
14 
HEDRICK COURT REPORTING 
P. 0. BOX 578, BOISE, ID 83701 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE O F  IDAHO) 
) ss .  
County of Ada ) 
I, WENDY J. MURRAY, a Notary Pub l i c  i n  and f o r  
t h e  S t a t e  of id ah^, do hereby c e r t i f y :  
That  t h e  foregoing  hea r ing  was manually 
t r a n s c r i b e d  by m e  from compact d i s c  record ing ,  and t h a t  t h e  
t r a n s c r i p t  c o n t a i n s  a f u l l ,  t r u e ,  and verba t im record  of t h e  
s a i d  hear ing ,  t o  t h e  b e s t  of my a b i l i t y .  
I f u r t h e r  c e r t i f y  t h a t  I have no i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  
event  of  t h e  a c t i o n .  
WITNESS my hand and s e a l  t h i s  2nd day of 
November, 20 07 .,,V,.- 
'*+$or t h e  S t a t e  oh fdaho ,  
$39 a t  Herriman, Utah. 
:a~I$$,&?&uriission e x p i r e s  2-5-2008. 
Idaho CSR No. 475. 
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SIEBE LAW OFFICES 
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P.O. Box 9045 
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Telephone: (208) 883-0622 
Facsimile: (208) 882-8769 
FILED 
BENEIqAN CCUZ~TY 
.i IqICHELE RPYNOL[IS. CLERK 
2001 DEC 26 PH 3: 40 
M THE DISWCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D I S m C T  OF 
TkE STATE OF IDAHO: IN AND FOR TEE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
BTCITT COLLEEN BmTON, 1 
) Case No. CV-07461 
Petitioner, 1 
1 
P... , ,  - , 
COMES NOW the above-named Petitioner, Britt Colleen Burton (hereafter 
"Rurton") by and through her attorney of record., and presents to tfie Court the following 
brief. 
I. ISSUES TO BE APPEALED 
K T  
6$$ 
k; A. Whether I.C. 5 49-808(1) is mconsti~tionally void as applied to this case 
i ~ %  1; 
because it fails to provide fair notice that signaling is appropriate when roadway design 
L* 
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B. 'Whether LC. 9 49-808(1) is mcons~tutionafly void as applied to this case 
because it fails to establish minirnal guidelines as to what is an "appmpriate signal" ta 
govern enforcement of the statute. 
X I .  STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Aupst  26,200'7, at approxiinately 2:36 a.m., ~urton was traveling out of St. 
Maries, Idaho, on Highway 3. A.L.S. Hrg. Transcr. 9:3-10 (Sept. 17,2007). The 
highway was a two-way highway. Id. at 16-19. As the hi@way climbed a hill, it had a 
leR-hmd passing lane and the regular right-hand lane in which Burton was traveling. Id. 
at 9:20-10:3. As Burton dimbed the hill, she passed a sign indicating that the lanes were 
going to merge. M. at 10: 18-23. The sign did not indicate which lane ended but only that 
the lanes were merging. Id, at 12:5-8, Burton did not signal when she passed that sign 
because she did not understand that she was required to signal when a passing lane 
disappears and she is traveling in the regular, right-hand lam going up a hill. Id. at 11:5- 
7; 11:lI-15. 
Shorlly aRer the left passing lane ended, Burton was pulled over by Deputy Sidney 
E. Hilton (hereafter ""Hilton'" of the Benewah County Sheriffs office. .Id at 10: 15-17; R. 
003. Nilton told Burton that fie pulled her over because she failed to signal when the 
two lanes became one. ALS Krg. Transcr. 10: 1 1-14, 1 I :8-XO; R. 003. At no time did 
Burton turn or exit the highway. ALS Hrg. Transcr. 11123-1234. 
A subsequent investigation by Hilton led to a charge of DUI, and Burton was 
served with a Notice of Suspension for Failure of Evjdentiary Testing. R, 001-003, In 
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accordance with stamtory provisions, BWon requested an admimisQative hearing on 
August 29,2007. R. 0 18-02 1, 
The administuative heaxing was conducted on Septe~~ber 17,2007. R. 027,045. 
Burton testified at the hearing as described above. ALS Hrg. Trmscr. 6:16-!?:lo. 
Burton ofired as exhibits the Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support, which 
she had filed in Benew& Comty District Court relative to her DUI charge. AI;S Hrg. 
Transcr. 5:3-65; R. 03 1-044. Said motion and memorandum in support argued that X.C. 
3 49-XOS(1) i s  unconstitutionally void as applied to Burton because it fails to provide fair 
aotice that her conducted is proscribed by the statute and it fails to establish minima1 
guidelines to govern enforcement of the statute. R. 03 1-044. Burton's argument relied 
on fhe Memorandm Decision and Order of Fi Ah District Magistrate Judge Israel, which 
was attached to the memorandum k support as Exhibit A. R. 042-044, 
In paragraph 1 of his Xjin&ngs of Fact, Administrative Hearing Examiner Eric G.  
Moody (hereafter "'Moody") stated that Burton's void for vagueness argument was not 
one on which an ALS hearing officer could rule and that he could not vacate Burton's 
license suspension based on that argument. R. 048. Therefore, he held that Elton had 
legal cause to stop Burton and sustained the suspension of her driver's license. R. 048, 
051. 
IIX. STANDARD OF fUEVXEW 
On judicial review, the District Court may set aside the administxative hearing 
officer's decision if the Court determines that the agency's findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions were, among other things, in violation of constitutional or 
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statu't'olly provisions. I.G. $67-527913). This includes arpmenb that a staate or 
ordinance on, which the agency's decision relied is void for vagueness. See Cman v. Bd 
MCommissioners ctfFP.ema~tt Gomty, Docket No. 30061 (2006); Duportt v. Idaho State 
Board of C~mmissiovters, 134 Idaho 6 18 (2000). 
IV. DZSCWSSXON 
The due process clause of the Fobeenfi Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be "worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" and that it 
be '"worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 
State v. Korsen, 13 8 Idaho 706,7 1 1 (2003). 
Therefore, a statute i s  void for vagueness if it "'fal[sJ to provide fair notice that the 
defendat's conduct was proscribed or faills1 to provide sufficient guidelines such that 
the police had unbridled discretion" in enforcing the statute. Id, at 71 2. The statute 
involved in this matter, I.C. 5 49-808(1) is unconstitutionafly void far both of these 
reasons. 
A statute is facially vague if it is "impermissibly vague in ajl of its applications," 
i.e. invalid in toto. ld. Howwer, even if a statute is  not facially vague it may still be 
vague '"as applied" tto a particular defendant's conduct. Id. Burton is not arguing that 
I.C. $j 49-808(1) is facially void but, rather, that it is void as applied to her conduct. 
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A, 1.C. 8 49-.808(1) is Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to This Case Because 
It Fails to Pravide Fair Notice that Sigflalinig is Appropriate When Roadway 
Design Necessitates Merging from Two Lanes into One. 
I.C. 5 49-808(1) states: 
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or: 
left upon a highway or merge onto ox exit from a highway unless and until 
the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an 
approp~ak sigal. 
In Sfate v. Dwbre, 133 Idaho 663,666 (Ct, App. 1.999), the comt heId that failing 
to signal. at the end of a passing lane constituted "movement'" and violated this stahte. 
However, as pointed out by Fifth District Magistrate Judge Israel, the court was divided 
and its opinion sent mixed signals. See Mizmorundm Decision a~td Order, State v. Dale, 
Blaine Comfy Case No. CR-2007-0783 dated June 6,2007, R.042443. 
As Judge Xsrae1,'s decision points out, the Dewbre court refused to consider 
whether the statute was mconst-itutionally vague because that issue was not raised below, 
See Dewbre, 13 3 Idaho at 667. Mthough Chief Judge Perry's opinion states that I.C. 4 
49-808 is plain and unambiguous, as Judge Israel states, this does not rule out an as 
app1,icd vagueness argument or there would have been no reason for the court to 
specifically leave that argument open.. See Meinorandurn Decision and Order, R. 043, 
Despite Chief Judge Perry's statement, I.C. 8 49-808 is hardly plain and 
unmbiguous, or, if it is plain and unambiguous, it can be palpably absurd 
as applied to many situations. Is weaving within a lane without a turn 
signal a violation of the statute? Is swerving to avoid a deer without a turn 
s i p d  a violation of the statute? Xs going around a bend in the road 
without a turn signal a violation of the statute? Consistent wit11 Judge 
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Perry's reslsonhg, the answer is yes, yet aalmost no one would apply the 
statute to these situafions. 
Id. at 43. 
The divided nature of the D m h  opinion, itself, supports Defendant's zwment 
that the stamte is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the pGsent case. In the main 
opinion, Chief Judge Perry states that he is 'konstrahcd" to find thctt the defendmt's 
action violated the statute "until further cladftcation i s  provided by the Idaho legisla~re." 
Id. at 666. 
In addition, in his concurring opinion, Judge SchwMman points out that '"any 
an Idaho driver would, in custom and practice, see no need to operate a turn signal in this 
hypm-technical situation." Id: at 667. Therefore, even Judge Schwartzman would agree 
that the statute does not give adequate notice to Idaho drivers of 'presumably ordinary 
htelligence" h t  a signal is required under the circumstances of thjs case. See 
Memorandm Decision and Order, R.043-044. 
This is reiterated in the dissmting opinion of Judge Pro Tern McDemott in which 
he states that common sense dictates that rhe word'hmove'% the statute "does not 
require a driver to signal where the driver, obeying tbe posted traffic sips, remains in the 
A@t-hand lane uatil the highway's structure forces the driver ro merge" into the 
remaining lane and that such a requirement "may confuse, rather than alert, other 
drivers." M. at 667-668. 
Further, because the term '"appropriate signal" is not defined in the Idaho Code, a 
person of ordinary intelligence is left to wonder when a signal is appropriate and, 
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therefme, required, Thai vameness d o c h e  does not require every word in a criminal 
statute to be slamtofily dcftned. State v. Casano, 140 Xdabo 461,464 (Ct. App. 2004). 
However, 'k statute must be construed so that effect i s  given to every word and clause of 
the statute'band Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language." Dmbre, 133 Idaho at 656. Therefore, effect must be 
given to the word "appropriate'" it is used in this statute. 
"Apppropriate" is defied as 'kuitabie or fitting far a particular purpose, person, 
occafion" ( h ~ : / / m . d i c t i o n ~ . c o m ,  accessed Sept. 5,2007) or "suitable for the 
occasion or ciremstarrces" (http://m.encarta.rnsn.com, accessed Scpt. 5,2007). 
Therefore, inclusion of the word "appropriate" in the statute implies that there are 
situations in which the use of a signal is not appropriate. The situations quoted above 
from Judge Tsrael's Memorandum and Decision makc clear that there arc: mmy situations 
in which a signal is not necessary or appropriate. However, because the statute provides 
no definition of the term "appropriate signal," (cg. when 0 t h  traffjc i s  present and your 
"movement" could impede or interfere with their c4movement"), people of ordinary 
intelligence are left to wonder when a signal is appropriate. fn fact, there are many 
situations, including the one presently before the court, in which "the appropriate signal 
under the circumstances was just as likely no signal at all." See Memorandm Decision 
a d  Order, R. 044. 
Burton was wavering in the right-hand lane of a highway that narrowed Erom two 
lanes to one. l[nerefbre, the design of the highway fforced Burton to merge into the 
remaining lane. There was no other trafec in the vicinity at the time whose travel was 
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potentially impeded or hterfered with by Burton% action. Therefore, it is 1Wy that the 
"appropriate signal" in this situation was no signal at all. However, because the statute 
fails to provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence whether the terns "movement" 
and "appropriate signal"' include such situations, it is unconstitutionally vague as applied 
to this situation and, therefore, void. 
B. I.C. 5 49-80811) i s  Unconsetutionally Vague as Applied to This Case Because 
it Fails to Provide Sufficient Guidelines as to When a Signal is Appropriate 
Thereby Giving Poiice Unbridled Discretion in Enforcing the Statute. 
A law that does not provide min.ima1 guide1,i.n~~ for enfarceinent "'impemissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, with the anendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584,586 (1990). This failure to provide minimal 
guidelines for d o r m e a t  is often "what tolls the death knell" for a statute. Id. at n. 4. 
This is "perhaps the most meaninghl aspect of  the vagueness doctrine." Id. (quoting 
Smith v, Oog~en, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1.974)). 
Xn Ritt, a city loitering and prowling ordinance was struck down as failing to 
provide sufficient enforcement guidelines. 1 18 Idaho at 590. Undm ~ , E  mdi,nance, a 
person could not be arrested or convicted unless he failed to identie himself and offer an 
explanation for his presence and conduct. Id However, the ordinance did not provide 
any guidelines for what constituted credible and reliable identif,cation. and, therefore, 
gave police officers coinplete discretion to make that detemination., .lid at 589-590. 
Although that ordinance was found to be facially void, the reasoning is cqually applicablc 
in this "as applied" vagueness challmgc. 
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Similar to Bin, I.C. 6 49-808(1)'s use of the phrase "appropriate signal" without 
providing further enforcement guidelines impermissibly gives officers complete 
discretion to decide who is and who is not violating the statute. Although a facial 
challenge of I.C. fi 49-808(1) might aot prevail because there are obvious situations in 
which a person of ordinary iatelligence would understand a signal to be appropriate, the 
statute i.s vague as applied to Burton's conduct, 
As discussed above, the situations quoted h r n  Judge Israel's Memorandum and 
Decision demonstrate that there are many situations in which a signal is not necessary. 
Not only does the statute's failure in defming the phrase "appropriate signal" leave a 
person of ordinary intelligence wondering when a signal is "appropriate," this failure to 
provide minimal guidelines provides police with unbridled discretion in determining 
whether the statute has been violated. As noted by Judge Israel, '%he minimal guidelines 
meant to establish the enforcement of the law are at best in flux." See Memorandum 
Decision and Order, R 044. 
Therefore, I.C. § 49-808(1) i s  unconstitutionaf ly vague as applied to Burton 
because it fails to provide minimal guidelines as to when a signal is appropriate thereby 
giving police oGcers unbridled discretion in enforcing the stature. 
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Ve CONCLUSION 
Because LC. 5 49-808(1) is void for vagueness and because Moody relied on that 
statute in making his decision that the officer had legal cause to stop Burton, his order 
sustaining the administrative suspension of Burton's driver's license should be vacated. 
DATED this&day of December, 2007. 
I hereby certify that on tho $hkday of December, 2007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated and addressed to the 
following: 
Rani A m o  v" U.S. Mail -
Attorney at Law - Hand Delivered 
P.0. Box 796 - Overnight Mail 
Hayden, ID 83835 - Facsimile (208) 667-9992 
r;; 
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RAM1 AMARO 
Specid Dquty Aeonlay General 
P.0, Box 796 
Hayden, Idaho 83535 
Tclwhone: (208) 661 -8248 8 Y: 
ISBA #5848 
Attorney for Re~ondent  - Idaho Trmspodadon Dcp-ent 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISWCT OF 
THE STATE OF TDAFIO, XN AND FOR THE COTJNTY OF BENEWAHX 
BRXTT C. BURTON, Case No. CV-07-46 1 




COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho Department of Transportation, by and 
through its attorney of record, RAM1 AMAIIO, Special Deputy Attorney Genemi, of the 
M R O  LAW OFFICE, and hcrcby respedfi~fiy submits Responden't's Brief. 
I.. WTRODUCTIOM 
This case atism &om the Idaho Transportation Department's (hmeinafier "the 
Depa~nent") suspension of Petitioner Brih C. Burton's (hereinafier "Appellant" or 
"Burton'") driving privileges. Burton requests tb,e reversal of thc Dqauttneni's order 
suspending her driving privileges. The Department requcsts that this Court uphold the 
suspension. 
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X I ,  FACTUAL Al'?D PROCEDUUL BACKGROUND 
On or about 2:36 in the morning, on A u p t  26, 2007, Deputy $Sidney E. Hilton 
fi~einafier ""Dquty Wilton", while patrolling Highway 3, obsexved Appdlant fail to 
signal whcn merdng lanes. At that point, Deputy 1-lilton proceeded to stop Appcllmt's 
vehicle, dm to the m m a r  in whic11 she was driving, at milepost 81. Page 1-5 of the 
adm inistrative record. 
Deputy Hilton approach& the vehicle, identified Appellant via her driver's 
license, and infomed her a~ to the reason for the stop. Appellant then infanned Dcputy 
Hilton that she never signals when merging. During this exchange, Dguty Wilton 
noti~ed a strong odor of alcohol emmating &om, the vehicle and thus asked Appellant if 
she had been drinking, in response to which Appellant admitted that she had consum& 
two beers. Td. 
Deputy Hilton then requested that AppeIlant gubmit to a series of  Eeld sobriety 
tests, to which she consented. Deputy Nilton proceeded said several field sobricty tests, 
including the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus bereinafter "HGN"'), the %walk-and-turny' 
evaluation, and the "one-leg stand" evaluation. Appdlant fai.led all three tests, and was 
then placed undcr arrest for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol bereimfier "DUB'). 
During said arrest Appellant insisted that she would be okay if simply allowed to r e m  
to her home. Id. 
Deputy Nilton transported Appellant to the Benewah County Sheriffs 
Dcpartmmt, where he proceeded to check her mouth for my fore@ objects or 
substances. He then played the advisory tape while waiting the required fifteen minutes. 
After the required wait period, Appellant submitted to two tcsb, with r d t s  of ,156 and 
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,152 respedvely. Appdlmt was &ereaAer cited for a DUI, notified of her license 
sqcns ion and released, Jd. 
Appellant later rqucsted an adminismt;ivc rcvicw, which revim was complctd 
with the Wearing Officer apholding the silspmion on Sqtmbcst 21, 2007. Appellant 
then requested this judicial review on September 26, 2007. Pages 18-21; 60-62 of the 
administrative record. 
111. HE-G EXAMINER'S mRXIVGS OF XiAC!'I'AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW -
After reviewing the submitted evidence, os listed on pages 45-47 of  the 
adminishtive record, the Hearing Examiner madc thc following pertinent findings of 
fact and conclusions of law on page 48 of the administrative record. 
I .  Deputy Nilton observed the vehicle driven by Burton fail to use the 
vehicle" turn gignals when merging &om lane o f  travel to another lane of 
travel as requircd by Idaho Code 49-808(1). 
2. Idaho Code does not require law enforcement to state a specific code 
vjolatim in their sworn statement when setting forth a legal cause to stop a 
petitioner's vehicle. 
3. Exhibit 3 is sufficient pursuant to Idaho Code 18-8002A(5)@)(ii) in 
describing Deputy Hilton's legal cause for stopping the vehicle Burton 
was driving. 
4. Legal issues such as those noted in Bxhibits A and B are not one of the 
issues that an administrative license suspension ( A U )  hearing officer can 
rule on as provided in Idaho Code 18-8002A(7) and supported by Stat6 v. 
." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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5, Burton's ALS c m o t  be vacatcd bascd upon what was articdatd in both 
Exhibits A and B. 
6. Deputy Hilton had legal came to stop the vehicle driven by Burton. 
A party aggrieved by the decision of a hearing officer may seek judicial review of 
the decision in the manner provided for in judicial review of Enat agency action as 
provided in Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code. I.C. 5 18-8002A(8). "[J]udicial review of 
disputed issues of fwt must be confined to the agency record for judicial review . . . 
supplemented by additional evidence take pursuant to section 67-5276, Idaho Code." I.C. 
(i 67-5277. 
The scope of review is such that "[tlhe court shall not substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." LC. $ 67-5279. 
The standard for review of on administrative decision is fbrher el.aborated: 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or 
by other provisions of law to ism an order, thc court shztll aRtm the 
agency action unless the oourt finds that the agency's findings, inferences, 
c~nclwions, or decision$ are: 
(a) in violation of constj.tutiona1 or statrutoty provisions; 
(b) in excess of tho statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawfuX procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, 
I f  the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole ox $ 
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
. . .  . . . .  . * . .  . 
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(4) Not*thstmding the prouisiow of subsections (2) and (3) of this 
section, a g ~ n ~ y  a~tians shall be afgrmed unless mbstantial rights of the 
appellant have been prgudiced. 
LC. 4 67-5279. 
If the hearing e x a e e r "  findings me clear, concise, dispositive, mpportd by the 
evidence, a .  not affected by m r s  of law, the findings should be uphdd by the Corttt. 
See Van Orden v. State Dep't vfHealth d2 Werare, 102 Idaho 663, 667, 637 P.2d 1159, 
1163 (1981). 
V. TSSUES ON APPEAL 
The issue$ raised by Appellant in her brief are limited to the following: 
1.  Whether I.C. $49-808(1) is unconstitutionally void as 
applied to this case. because it fails to provide fair notice that signaling is appropriate 
when roadway design xleoessitates merging fiom two lanes into one. 
2. Whether I.C. 6 49-80&(1) is unconstitutionally void as applied to this case 
because it fails to establish minimal guidelines as to what is an "appropriate signal" to 
govern enfozemmt of the statute. 
Appellant argues that Appellant's szzspension may be set aside by this Court based 
on Appellmt's arpmmt &.at the D e p m e n t  relied on a statute or ordinance that is void 
for vagueness. 
VI* ARGUrnNT 
A. Standard of Review 
The Idaho Adrni.nistrative Procedure3 Act (IDAPA) governs the review of 
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or r e s ~ c t  a person's 
driver's license. I.C. 49-201,49-330,67-5201 and 67-5270. A court reviewing at1 agency 
................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . .  - . . . . . . . . . . .  .................................. 
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decision cannot mbstitute its j u d ~ m t  for that of the agmcy as to the wej&t of the 
evidence praented. Raaer, the court mugt dejFer to the agmcy's findkgs of fact unless 
they are clearly monmus. In other words, the agency's factual detminations are 
binding on the r&ewkg court, cvcn where there is conflicting evidence before the 
agency, so long as thc d e e a l i i o n s  &rare supported by $ubstfmtiaf competent 
evidmce in the rccord. In Re Su~ension of Driver's License, 143 IdAa 937 
(App. 2006) 155 P.3d 1 176. 
A reviewing court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, 
inferences, concXmions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or comtitut;od provisions; &I) 
excmd the agency's staatory authority; (c) are made upon unlawi%l procedure; (d) are 
not suppotted by subsmtinl evidence in the record; or (t3) are arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion. LC. j 67-5279(3), The party challmgng the agency decision must 
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. 8 67-5279(3) and that a 
substantial right of that patty fias been prejudiced. In Re, supra. If thc agency's decision is 
not a % r d  on appeal, "it sh.al.1 be set asidc . . . and remanded for further procedkm as 
necessasy." I.C. # 67-5279(3). 
B. ANALYSIS 
The administrative license mspension (ALS) statute, I.C. 8 18-8002A, requires 
that the Idaho Tritnsportation Department (ITD) suspend th,e driver's license of a driver 
who has failed a BAC test ndministcrcd by a law enforcemmt offieex Y,r.e period of 
suspension is ninety days for a driver's first failure of an evjdentiary tmt and one year .For 
any subsequent tmt hilure within five yew. I.C. § 18-8002A(4)(a). A person who has 
. ,, ... . , .  . .  ' ,  . ., .. , .. . . . . . . .. . ., , .. . . , .. ' . 
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been notifid of s u ~ h  an administrative license suspension may request a hearing before a 
hearing officer designated by the ITD to contest the suspension. I.C. 5 18-8002A(7). At 
the administmtive hean'ag, the burdm of proof rests upon the driver to prove my of the. 
grounds to vacate the suspension. I.C. 9 18-8002A(7); In Re, supra. The hearing officer 
pust uphold the sumension unless he or she finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the driver has shown one of several gmunds enumerated in LC. 8 18-8002A(7) fur 
vacating the suspmion. Those g o u ~ d s  include: 
(a) The pence offimr did not have legd cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to belicve the puson had bem driving or was in 
actual physical control of a vehicle whiIe under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other 
intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18.-3W4C or 
18-5006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) The test rr;sults did m t  show an alcohol concentration or the presence ofdrugs or 
other intoxicating substances in violation of section 1 8-8004, 18-8004C or 123-8006, 
Idaho Code; or 
(d) The tests for aIcohol concentration, dm@ or othm intoxicatiry3 substances 
adtninisterd at the di.rection of the peace oEcer were not conducted in accordance with 
the requirements of section 18-8004(45, Idaho Code, or the tasting equipment was not 
hnctioning properly when the test was administered. . . . 
The b.wring officer's decision is subject to challenge through a pation for 
judicial review. I.C. 4 18-8002A(8}: In Re, supra. Presumably, Appellant is arguing that 
due to the alleged w,constitutiondity of I.C. 49-808(1), that Deputy Hilton did not have 
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legal cause to stop Appcllmt, thereby constituting a basis on which the Hearing 
allegedly should have sat aside thc wpmsion of Appellant's driver's lliccmse. 
C. Legal Cause 
Appellant presumably argues that D~puty Wilton lacked legal cause to 
$top Appellant. Pursmnt to I.C. 18-8002A(7), it was A ~ e l l m t v s  burden to prcscnt 
evidence aEmativcly showing that the Dquty Hilton lacked legal cause to stop 
Appellmt's vehicle, 
A trafEc stop by a member of law enk rmen t  constituta a seizure of the 
vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendmat's prohibition against 
umeasonable searches and seizurw. In Re, supra. Under the Fourth Amendment, a 
mmbcr of law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven 
contrary to traffic laws. The reasomblaess of the suspi~ion must be waluatt?d upon the 
totality of the cirwm~tmces at the time ofthe stop. The reamable suspidon standard 
requires less than probable cause but more &an mac speculation or instinct on tb,e part of 
the officer. A manber o f  law enforcment may draw reasonable inferences firom the 
facts in his or her possession, ao,d those i.nferencas may be drawn from the member's 
experience and law enforcement training. Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the 
conduct observed by the officer fell within the broad range of what can be described as 
normal driving behavior. Id. 
The hearing officer properly concluded that Appellant failed to prove that the 
Deyuty Hilton lacked le8al cause to stop Appellant. Deputy Hi l to~  observed Appellant 
. . .  
fail to signal while changing lanes via metgin$ on Highway 3, despite the fact that there 
" . . . . . . . .  " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ............,.I . ‘ . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  ." ....... ". ............................ "" .............. 
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was obviously a rnmber of law enfor~mmt in c behind Appellant. The 
that Deputy Hilton was proper in stopping Appellmt's vehicle to irrvestigate possible 
criminal behavior. DquV Hilton's action was proper as at that point there was a 
rmonablc and aGiculablc suspicion that the vehicle was b&ng driven contrary to traRc 
laws. It was Dquty Hilton's understding that it was a ~olntion of traffic taw to 
chmge lanes and/or merge without signaling which undemtanding was based upon his 
baining and expdence. Basing Deputy Hilton's action in $topping Appellant on the 
toblity of the circumstances at the time of the stop, Deputy Hilton's suspicion was 
rwonable, md consisted of more than mere speculation or instinct. 
Apellant appears to argue that Deputy Wilton did not have probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion necessary to makc a legal traffic stop. However, in sitnations such 
as these, probable came to believe the law has been broken outbalance3 
private intwest in avoiding police contact. Whrm v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,817-1 8 
(1 996). An member of law mforc-ement may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible 
cn'minal behavior if there is n reasonable and dculable suspicion that the vehicle is 
being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 41 1,417(1 981), 
Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are objective tests. Ncither test depends on the 
individual officer's subjective thoughts nor upon the bases offered by the state to justifjr 
the stop. Deen v.$fute, 131 Idaho 435,436,958 P.2d 592,593 (1998) (reasonable 
suspicion); State v. Muphy, 129 Idaho 861,863-64,934 P.2d 34,3G-37 (Ct.App. 1997) 
(probable muse). Thus, in deta ining whether a trafFic stop constituted a lawful seizure, 
courts fieely apply relevant law to the objective facts presented, uncoustrclincd by law 
enforcement's cmwa tcd  reasoning. ''his prevents costly rcsort to the excXusianasy mte 
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where a police o%cer or prosecutor merely fails to articulate the approMate justi8m~on 
for an o h w i s e  legal search or seizure. Sbnie v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554,558, 
D, Vn1idit.y of I.C. 49-808[1) 
AppdIant, in this case, argues that I.C. 49-808 is suffjiciently vague to be 
unconstitutional and therefore invalid, p~mmably  resulting in a Iack of probable cause 
for stop, and a basis oh which the Hearing Officer could vmate Appellant's suspmsion. 
Appellnnt attempts to reach this Same point via an q p n e n t  that as the statute is 
unconstiWtiond, that the Hearing Officer committed revasiblc error by relying on it, 
thereby warranting this Court's reversal of the Hearing officer's decision. 
Of the two Idnho cascs which intefpret I.C. 49-808, neither explicitly examines 
whether the statute is unconstitutional. In the first, which is most similar factually to the 
case at hand, Appellant contended that the offim lacked the requisite suspicion to stop 
his vehicle because 1.C. $49-808 did not rquire the use of signals when entering or 
exiting a passing area. The Court in that case examined the issue, finding as follows: 
"The relevant portion 0fI.C. § 49-808 providef that no person "shall turn a vehkk  or 
move right or leji upon a highway unless and until the movement cant be made with 
reasomble safety nor without giving an appropriate signal." Dewbre contendp tho1 I. C. $ 
49-808 requires #he use ofhun signals only when o vehicle i u m  or makes u lane change. 
.Dmbre conlends that he did not turn or change lanes, that he contintred in the same lane 
while entering atid eriting the pussing area, and that he, therefore, wa,? n ~ t  required to 
use his signal. Dewbre also argues that LC. $ 49-808 requires the use ofsigMIs only 
when uppropria& and thai no turn signal is the ffappr~priate signuZ" w h e ~  the vehicle 
movement can be made with reasonably safity. 
This Court exercises free review over the upplicu fion and contbvcnon of statutes. Stlrte 
v. Schumacher, 131 Idnho 454. 485, 959 P.Zd 465, 466 (Cl.App. J998). Generally, 
'ywjord$ a Jphrares are cdnsWed according to the context and the approved usage of 
the language." I.C. $ 73-113. A stuhrte murr be construed so that efeccr is given to every 
word and c k w e  of a stabte. State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416 417-18. W 3  P.2d 768. 
. .. . . . .  ................................ ..................... . . ........ 
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769-70 (Cr.App. 1999). The task ofthe court "in interpreting the meaning o f l a ~ p a g e  
eontairned in a statute is to give efect to the le@i~ture's intent and puvose." State v. 
Coleman, 125 Idaho 466, 469, Bf 5 P.2d 28, 31 (Ct.App. 1996). mere LL no occm ion for 
construction where the h a m e  Page 666 ofa stahte is plain and unambisow. State v. 
MizCoy, 128 fdalzo 362, 363, 913 P.2d 578, 781 (19961. "The plain, oliviotrs avtd ratioml 
meaning is always prefcmed to any hidden, narrow or irraiional meaning." State v. 
Arragmith, 132 Idaho 33, 40, 966 P.2d 33, 40 (Ct.AppP 1998), 
The fata~tguage oj-I.C. $49-808 is plain and unambipow and must be given efect. The 
following holding fvom the district court's order afimdng the ma@@ate1s dersiai of 
Dewbre's suppression motion correct!y analyzes the stahrteic application: ??%en Dewbre 
approached like portion ofthe highway containing a passing lane, the sign rquired him 
to " k e p  right accept 80 pass." As such, Dewhre moved his vehick to the right to comply 
with this requirement, When Dewlire reached the end ofthe portion of the highway that 
cotzrained a passing lane, !he record clearly establishes that there was a sign requiring 
Dewbre to merge back into the lefi lane. 212;s required a bming moverrzent to the lej?. X f  
is undisputed the [sic] Dewbre made these movements, and it is also undispertad that he 
did not signal when he made either turn. By failing to signal when he made these turns, 
Dewbre violated I.C. 5 49-808. 
It i~ ~ n r e  that at the p i n t  Dewbre made these turning mmuvm; the dashed line did not 
separate the le$ and righr nodhbound lanes. However, the statute does not strictly limit 
its application to the lane changes. Instead, the statute requires a signal whensver an 
individwl make$ a "move right or lefi upon a highway.' Had the legislature intended 
only to regulate t u r n  and lane changes, it could have stated so spec($cally. By moving 
first right, and the~z leftl Dewbre c a m  within the ambit ofthe statute, and war required 
to make to [sic] s i p a l  
I am constrained to agree. Upon entering the passing arm Dewbre moved his vehicle to 
Ihe right in ordot- to comply with the highwcry signage. Upon exiting the passing area, 
Dewbre moved his vehicle to the lep, complyiybg once again with the highway 
signage, There are no exceptions in I.C. f 49-808 to the signal requirement. State v. 
Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 279, 954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct.App. 1998). Whenever a 
movment is made to the left or right an a highway, regnrd1ess ofwhether the ilrovemenf 
is made necessary to comply with highway signage, an 
appmpriate signal is required purszcant to I.C. § 49-808. 
I do not attempt by this holding to deJiMe the boundwies ofwhat constilutar a "movement 
to the right or 1cJi' upon a highway." 1 conclude on& that Dewbre's movements placed 
him withia the ambit ofthe statute. Until fidrther clarajsca~on is provided by the Idaho 
legi,clature, I urn const~ained to hold that whenever a vehicle movcs to the right or to the 
lej2 becawe one lane splits into two lanes, or two lanes merge into one lane, an 
appropriate signal is required pursuant to I.C. 49-805. Therefore, I.C. $ 49-808 
required Dewbre to use an appropriate signal when he moved to the right while entering 
the passing area and  the^ to $h"heleft while exiling [he passing area. 
1 1 I R e s p o n d e n . t ' s  ' B r i e f  
PAGE 13115 
Dewbre further argues that no sl'gnal is the appropriate signal when the vehicle 
movemeat be m d e  with redsonabb safity. The plain Ianguczge 0fl .C. $ 49-808 
provides that an individual may ''move righi or leg? upon a highway" if two rquirements 
are met: (I) if "rhe movement can be made with recasonabte safety" and (2) iJ "an 
apjoropriale sigiaal" is given. Even i f a  vehicle can be moved with redsonable safe& LC. 
$49-808 still veqwires the use o f tam signals when m l d ~ g  the movement to the right or 
Ie?. Fwthemore, the Idaho legislature spec$cally amended the turn sigvral Law dekting 
the exception Dewbre arpes. Prior to the amendment, fhe staute provided that ran 
appropriatg s ipal  w s  only required "in the event any other traflc may be aflected by 
such movement." 1953 Idaho Sess. Caw 507. This exceptio~ was removed in 1977 by the 
ldrzho legislature. 1977 Idaho Sem. Law 370. Comeguently, the legislahre intended that 
turn signals Ac used when moving right or left on a higkwq regardlass ofwhether other 
traflc may be meted or a vehicle is moving with reasonabk safety. f agree with the 
dbtn'ct court that an appvoprinte signal requires "such a sigttal as wouldput others Page 
667 on notice ofthe driver's intention ta ma& a hcming mowment, and that it way not 
the intent ofthe legislature to negate the requirement of signaling when making a ~ n i ? t g  
moventent. I f  
S ta.tc v. Dcwbre, 13 3 Idnho 663 (App. 1999). 
Appellant argues that the statute is so ambiguous as to be unconstilutiondly 
vague. However, the Idaho Appellate Court, in the above opinion, specifically held that 
"the laizguage Q ~ L  C, $49-808 is plain and unambiguow and mwt be given eflect ". The 
Idaho AppetIate Court M e r  found that, pursuant to I.C. 49-808, a driver must signal 
when. changing Ianes or when merging. Id. If that statute were so vague that such 
detmnatjon codd not be made, such a holding would be unlikely.' 
statute is neither void for vagueness nor facially vague - either pursuant to 
the standards set forth in the State v. Korscn case, or standards set fort11 in the State v. 
Bitt m e .  It does not fail to set forth minimal guidelines for en.forcmmt. Nor does it fail 
to provide fair notice that a particular conduct is proscribed. 
Further, thc Hearing Officer in this matter had no auth.ority to detmnine 
whether the statute was unconstitutional or void. The Hearing Of'fictcer's duty was to 
' Notc that the Appellant in this cilsc did not intraduoc cvidenoc similar ta &st introduced by Dewbre in 
terms of signage and vehiclc movement. 
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uphold the suspension abswt certain proofs8 which burden AppeIlmt failed to mwt. 
Amellant pzmumably ar&es onc of two issues: First, that the Hearing Officer made his 
decision based on invalid or unconstitulional law; Next, that the H e h g  O E c a  
pesumably should havc held the stop to be without cause based on an identical argument 
regarding the stlute at issue. Thc error is said a r m e n t  is that the Hearing Officn based 
his opinion on cuncnt, valid law which had been upheld in a near idcm~cal sccnario. The 
Hmdng Officer had no authority to d m  said taw invalid. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Court's review is now confined to the agency record. Idaho Code tj 67-52??. 
This Court cannot substicute its judgnmt for that of the agency as to the weight of Ule 
evidence or questions of fact. Idaho Code 8 67-5279. This Court shall affirm the bearing 
decision, mlcss it finds that the hearing examiner's findings: (1) violate constitutional or 
statutory pravisions; (2) e x c d  statutory authority or are made upon unlawful procedure; 
(3) are not suppoYeed by the substantial evidenoc on the whole; or (4) a x  arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Id. Notwithstanding the existence o f  my of the 
afo~ementioned grounds for reversal, this Court shall also affirm the agency action if tbe 
subsmtial rights o f  the appellant were not prejudiced. 
Appellant has not shown to this court that the hearing examiner's findings are i t 3  
violation of statutory or constitutional provisions, that they exceed statutory authority, 
that they are made upon unlawful procedure$ that they are not supported by substantial 
evidence on the whole, or that t h y  are srbieary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
Nor has the Appellant shown that any of her substantial rights were prejudiced. 
Tllerefore. thc Department respcctfilly requests that this Court uphold the decision of the 
. " "" " "" . . ." "." " " " .  
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hearing examiner in this man&, and leave the suspension of Appellant's license 
undismrbed. 
DATED this 8* day of February, 2008. 
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Special Dcputy Attorney General 
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C O N S  NOW the above-named Petitionex; Britt Colleen Burton (hereafter 
"'Burton.") by and though her attorney of  record, and presents to the Court the following 
reply brief. 
Respondent's Brief can be broken down into three arguments: 1) that the statutory 
vagueness argument is not properly before the court; 2) that I.C. 5 49-808 is not 
unconstitutionaIly vague; 3) a substantial right of Burton was not prejudjced. All three of 
these arguments are erroneous, an.d this reply brief will, address each of them in turn. 
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Under 1.C. S\ 18-8002A(7f, hsufficient legal cause to stop the driver is one of the 
gounds on which a hearing oMicer may vacate an ahiniseative l icew suspension. A 
detemination of whether the stop of a vehicle is lawful includes an malysis of whether 
the sak te  on which the stop was based was zsmnstitutional. Therefore, such an analysis 
i s  a necessw part of tfie hm1-i.ng examher's inquiry and the hearing examiner does have 
statutory au&ority to make such an analysis subject, of course, to judicial review. 
In addition, administrative proceedings that apply general rules to specific 
individuals, interests or situations, are quasi-judicial in nature and subject to due process 
constraints. Cooper v. Bd. of County Commissioners o p d a  County, 10 1 Idaho 407,409- 
4 X 1 (1 980); Cowan v, Bd. of Commissioraers ofFrsmonr County, 143 Idaho 50 1,148 P.3d 
1247, 1256 ( 2006). See also American f i l l s  Xeservoir Dis. No. 2 v. 171e Idaho Dept. of 
'liyater Resawces, Docket Nos. 33249/33311/33399 (2007) (referring to tbe "quasi- 
judicial functions" of administrative bodies). 
At an adminisb"ati.ve license suspension hearing, the heating examiner applies 
general rules to the individual and situation before it. Therefore, the hearing is quasi- 
judicial and is subject to due process constraints. These due process constraints include 
whether the statute on which the administrative action is based is unconstitutionally 
vague. See Cowan at 1259-60; Dupovat v, Moho $sate Board ofCommissioners, 134 
Idaho 61 8,623 (2000); American Falls Reservoir Dis. No. 2. 
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Purthct, in Idaho, due process is not satisfied d e s s  judlciaf review is  provided 
from the decision of an administrative agency, Northern Frontier hc.  v. Stttte, 129 Idaho 
437,439 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Graves v. Cogwell, 97 Idaho 716 (1976)). If the 
statutory scheme for ITD administrative hwitl$s (which scheme incIudes, in 
combination, LC. 5 18-8002A(7) and IRMA) does not provide for constitutional 
challenges at either the administrative hearing level or on judicial review, the scheme 
itself violates the procedwal due process rights of drivers. Therefore, the hea~ng 
officersTmdings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions could be ovemmed as being 
made upon unlawfi! procedure. X.C. $67-5279(3)(c). 
While LC. 65-5279 does require that the reviewing court defer to the agency's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, a determination of whether a statute is 
void fur vagueness is not a question of fact. Rather, the constitutionality of a statue is a 
question o f  law over which appellate courts exercise free review, See American Fulls 
Resentair Dis. No. 2; MDS Invclstments, LLC v. State, 138 Idaho 456,461 (2003). The 
District Court is acting in an appellate capacity for judicial review of this administrative 
decision and, therefore, the question of whether I.C. tj 19-808(1) is unconstihltionally 
vague is properly before the court and the court exercises fiee review over the issue. 
B. I.C. 5 49-808rI) is  Uncomsti~~ona1X~ Vague as Amlied to This Case. 
This argument was filly addressed in Petitioner's Brief filed on December 26, 
2007. Therefore, Petitioner directs the COW to that brief and will not repeat that 
argument in its entirety h a .  However, Petitioner would like to make the Following 
points: 
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Respondent sbtes in its brief that ""Appellmt q e s  that the stalute is so 
ambiguous as to be unconstitutionally vague." See Respondent" Brief, p. 12 (Feb. 8, 
2008). This statemenl implies that Burtoa is arguing that the statue is facially vague. 
Hwever, Petitioner's Brief sets forth. the differences between a 'Yacially vague" 
arwment and a '"vague as applied'' argument and clearly states that "Burtan is not 
a r p h g  that I.C. $49-808(1) is  facially void but, rather, that it is void as applied to her 
conduct." 
The Dewbre court's satement that the sbtute is "plain and u n m b i g u o u s ' ~ ~  not 
contrary to an "as applied" vagueness argument. In ordtx to be facially vague, a statute 
must be '"mpemnissibly vague ia all o f  its applications." State v. Kotsen, 138 Idaho 706, 
712 (2003)' There are situations to which I.C. $49-808(1) clearly applies (such as 
mtehg or exiting a highway) and, therefore, the statute i s  not facially vague. 
Howt:ver, even if not facially vague, a statute may stilt be uncaxxstitutionally vague 
when applied to a specific situation. Id. In Dewbre, the traffic stop based on the 
defendant's failwe to signal when the highway's structure forced him to merge from two 
lanes to one was "a barely plausible traffic stop." Dewbre at 668, J. Schwa&man, 
concurring opinion, n. 2. Yet, the court specifically stated that it was declining to address 
the issue of whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague because the defendant had 
not raised the argument below. Id at 667. 
Further, in J. Schwartzman's concurrjng opinion, he agreed in the result (that, 
again, was not based on a vagueness a r ~ m e n t )  "despite the fact that many an Idaho 
driver would, in custom and practice, see no need to operate a turn signaI" in such a 
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hyper - t ec~cd  situadon. Id. at 668. He dso painted out his o\vn obsemations that 
individuals rarely signal in such a situation. Id, n, 2. These comments by him indicate 
thag had a vagueness challenge properly been before the court, J. Schw@mzm would 
have at least considered the possibility that the statute did not give adequate notice to 
people of ordinary intelligence ~oncerning the condud it proscribes and may have been 
void for vameness as applied to that situation. 
Again, vapeness was not properly before tbe Dwbre cowt and, therefore, was 
not addressed by the court. Id. at 667. I-Iowever, it was addressed by Fi* District 
Magistrate Judge Israel in State v- X-Tarriscrn Mat~hav Bale, Blaine County Case No. CR- 
2007-0783. See Memoradum Decision an$ Order, R. 042-044, There, in a situation 
very similar to the one presently before the court, Judge Israel's reasoned holdjng was 
that I.C. 5 49-808 is "palpably absurd as applied to many situations" itlcIuding a situation 
such a3 when highway structure: forces a driver to merge from two lanes to one, Id. at 43. 
Judge Isreal's holding that the statute was vague as applied i s  supported by the divided 
nature of the .Dwbre opinion, the particular comments referenced above made by J. 
Schwastman in his concu&g opinion, as well as the dissenting opinion of J. 
NcDemott. 
I.C. (j 49-80861) requires an 'kppropriate" signal, and mles of statutory 
interpretation require that the word "approp~ate" be given effect. Dewbm at 665. As set 
forth in Petitioner's Brief, "appropriate" i s  defied as ''suitable or fitting for a particular 
purpose, person, occasion'~(http:lIm.dictiona'y.com, accessed Sept, 5,2007) or 
"suitable for the occasion or circumstances" ( h t t p : / / ~ ~ ~ . e n c ~ . m s n . c o m ,  accessed 
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Sept. 5,2007). Therebe, Jnclusion of the word "appropriata" in the sQtute implies that 
there are situations in which the use of a signal is not appropriate. 
As explabd in Judge Israel's opinion, there are many sihations in which a signal 
is not necessw or appropriate even though the driver is engaged in "movement" on the 
highway. However, because the ststute provides no definition of tho term "appropriate 
signal,'" (e.g. when your "movement" could impede or iaterfere with the "movement" o f  
another vehicle), people of ordinary intelligence are left to wonder when a signal is 
appropriate. In fact, there are many situations, including the one presently before the 
court, in which 'We appropriate signal under the circumstances was just as likely no 
sipd at all ." See Memorundm Decision and Order, R. 044. 
Further, the failure to define when a signal is appropriate "impemissibly delegates 
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries far resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." 
State v. Bit?, 118 Idaho 584,586 (1990). The failure to provide minimal guidelines as to 
when a signal is appropriate Yells the death knell" for this statute because providing 
guidelines is "perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine." Id. at n. 4. 
In Bitt, tfie Court found statute before it vague because it did not define what 
constituted credible and reliable identification and, therefore, gave law enforcement 
complete discretion in that determination. Id. at 589-90. Although Birt dealt with a 
facially vague challenge, whether the statute supplies sufficient guidelines is also part of 
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As pohted out by Judge Israd, there are mmy sirnations in which the 
"appropriate" signal may be no signal. However, because the statute fails to provide any 
guidelines, law enforcement had wbridled discretion to determine whether a signal was 
appropriate in this situation. Therefore, LC. 8 49-X08(1) is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to Burton because it fails to provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
whetha a signal is appropriate in situa~ons uch as the one before the court. Further, the 
statute is unco~lstitutionally vague as applied to Burton because it failed to provide law 
enfoxcment with minimal guidelines for determining whether a signal was appropriate in 
this situation. 
C. Burton's Substantial Due Process Rights Were Preiudfced-. 
1TB's rtndjngs, inferences, conclusions, or decisions can be overturned on judicial 
review if they violate I.C. 8 67-527913) and if they prejudiced a substantial right of 
Burton. 
Because a statute that i s  void for vagueness fails to give adequate notice of the 
behavior proscribed and/or fails to provide minimal guidelines to those enforcing the 
statute, the void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept. US. v. 
Professional Air Traflc Covltrcrlleps Qrgunizath, 1 88 F.3d 53 1 (I st Cir. 1982); 
H~tchim v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531 @.C. Cir. 1999). 
There is no question that an individual has a substantial right not to be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The violation o f  a procedural due 
process right constitutes prejudice of a substantial rights under I.C. 4 67-5279. Although 
few Idaho cases contain specific discussions on whether a substantial right was 
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prejudiced by an agency action or decision, many caes cite this standmd and then End 
For the petitioner based on various violations of the stahtte. Therefore, these cases can be 
interpreted as holding that those violations of  the statute constimed prejudice of a 
substantial right of the petitioner. 
In Fr;rcher v. City ofKefchm,  the Court held that the planning and zoning 
cornmission had violated Fischer's procedwd due process rights. 141 I W o  349,355 
(2005) (sbting that actions such as those by the commission weakened or possibly 
nulljfied imested  parties' rights to a public headng), Although it did not specifically 
state that a subsmtid right of Fischer had been prejudiced, the Court did cite the 
"prejudice of a substantial ri&t'>standwd contained in 1.C. 67-5279(4) and held that 
Fischer was the prevailing party in the dispute. Id. at 352-353,356. Therefore, this case 
can be interpreted as holding that a procedural due process violation prejudices a 
substantial right of the party, 
In Bacret v. Bower Corn@, the County appealed a district court ruling in favor of 
Eacret and other petitioner's. 139 Idaho 780 (2003). The Court found that the 
petitioners' pmcedural due process rights were violated because one ofthe planning, and 
zoning commissioners had made statements indicating bias and the inability to judge the 
matter fairly and had engaged in ex parte mmmunications resulting in evidence that was 
not available lo the entire Board or equally to the parties. Id. at 786-787. Therefore, the 
Court affirmed the district court ruling in favox of petitioners. Id. at 787. Again, the 
Court did not specifically state that a substantial right of the petitioners was prejudiced. 
However, it cited the 'prejudice of a substantial right" standard contained in LC. 9 67- 
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5279(4) a d  upheid the district court's ruling. Id, at 784, 787. Therefore, this case also 
can be interpreted as holding that a procedural due process violation prejudices a 
substantial right oF&e party. 
In Cooper v. Board ofBi"~f8xsional Discipline ofldaho State h'oard of Medicine, 
the Court held that the Board violated Cooper's due process rights by disciplining him for 
behavior of which he did not have specific notice. 134 Idaho 449,454-455 (2000) 
(holding that Cooper's due process rights were violated because he was not given specific 
notice in the complaint of a11 charges brought against him and fir which he was 
disciplined). Although the Court's sling in Cooper's favor was also based on another 
violation by the Board, because it cited thc "prejudice of a substantial right" standard 
contained in I.C. $67-5279(4) and ruled in Cooper's favor, this case also can be 
interpreted as holding that a procedural due process violation for failure of notice 
prejudices a substantial right of the party. 
Burton has a substantial due process right that has been prejudiced by her being 
disciplined based on a statute that is vague as applied to her situation and, therefore, did 
not provide notice that it was applicable to her behavior. 
DA'IED this$ $day of February, 2008. 
SIEBE LAW OFFICES n 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH 
B R I T  C. BURTON, 
Appellant. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, 
CASE NO. CV-2007-461 
OPINION & ORDER RE: APPEAL 
Respondent, I 
I 
Appellant Britt Burton seeks judicial review of respondent ldaho 
Transportation Department's order suspending her driver's license. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In re Suspension of Driver's License of Gibbar, 143 ldaho 937, 941-42, 
155 P.3d 1176, 11 80-81 (Ct.App.2006) sets out the applicable standard of review 
as follows: 
The ldaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the 
review of department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, 
disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's driver's license. . . . This 
Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to 
the weight of the evidence presented. This Court instead defers to 
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the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In 
other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the 
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the 
agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial 
competent evidence in the record. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or 
constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory 
authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The party 
challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency 
erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a 
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. If the agency's 
decision is not affirmed on appeal. "it shall be set aside . . . and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." I.C. § 67- 
5279(3). 
(Citations omitted.) 
Burton's challenge to the suspension is centered upon a contention that 
ITD erroneously found that the stop of her vehicle by Benewah County Deputy 
Sheriff Sidney Hilton, just after 2:30 a.m. on August 26, 2007, was based upon 
legal cause. In re Suspension of Driver's License of Gibbar, supra, states: 
The administrative license suspension (ALS) statute, I.C. § 18- 
8002A, requires that the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) 
suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a BAC test 
administered by a law enforcement officer. The period of 
suspension is ninety days for a driver's first failure of an evidentiary 
test and one year for any subsequent test failure within five years. 
person who has been notified of such an administrative license 
suspension may request a hearing before a hearing officer 
designated by the ITD to contest the suspension. At the 
administrative hearing, the burden of proof rests upon the driver to 
prove any of the grounds to vacate the suspension. The hearing 
officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she finds, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of 
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several grounds enumerated in I.C. $ 18-8002A(7) for vacating the 
suspension. Those grounds include: 
(a) The peace ofticer did not have legal cause to stop the person 
# . . .  
The hearing officer's decision is subject to challenge through a 
petition for judicial review. 
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's 
occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the Fourth 
Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible 
criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion 
that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. The 
reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the 
totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. The 
reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause 
but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. 
An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or 
her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the 
officer's experience and law enforcement training. Suspicion will 
not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell 
within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving 
behavior. 
id. 143 Idaho at 942-43, 155 P.3d at 1181-82 (citations omitted). 
ITD found that Officer Hilton stopped defendant for moving left on the 
roadway without signaling, in violation of I.C. § 49-808. Subsections one and two 
of that provision state: 
( I )  No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle 
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway 
unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety 
nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required 
shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled- 
access highways and before turning from a parked position, the 
signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds 
and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred 
(1 00) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
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Burton argues that I.C. g 49-808 is void-for-vagueness as applied to her. 
She does not contend that I.C. 49-808 is void-for-vagueness in all of its 
applications. State v. Korsen, 138 ldaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (Idaho 2003) states: 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This 
doctrine requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be worded 
with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and that the statute be 
worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. It is a basic principle of due process that an 
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly 
defined. Furthermore, as a matter of due process, no one may be 
required at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning 
of penal statutes. This Court has held that due process requires 
that all "be informed as to what the State commands or forbids" and 
that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the 
meaning of the criminal law. A statute may be void for vagueness if 
it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
concerning the conduct it proscribes, or if it fails to establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must 
enforce the statute. 
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face 
or as applied to a defendant's conduct. For a "facial vagueness" 
challenge to be successful, "the complainant must demonstrate that 
the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." In other 
words, the challenger must show that the enactment is invalid in 
toto. To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a 
complainant must show that the statute, as applied to the 
defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the 
defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient 
guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in 
determining whether to arrest him. A "facial vagueness" analysis is 
mutually exclusive from an "as applied" analysis. 
Id. 138 ldaho at 71 1-12, 69 P.3d at 131-33 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). State v. Schurnacher, 136 ldaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct.App.2001) 
states: 
An appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute 
that will uphold its constitutionality. A statute's possible infirmity for 
vagueness may be avoided by a judicial construction of the statute 
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that is consistent with legislative intent and comports with 
constitutional limitations. When interpreting a statute, we begin 
with the supposition that the legislature intended the ordinary 
meaning of the words it used unless a contrary intent is clearly 
expressed. 
Id. 136 ldaho at 51 9, 37 P.3d at 16 (emphasis added). 
Burton contends that I.C. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague as applied 
to her because it was impossible for her to know whether I.C. § 49-808 required 
her to signal under the circumstances then present. First, Burton focuses on the 
statutory requirement of a signal when a vehicle "movejs] . . . right or left upon a 
highway." Burton contends that the traffic sign present, "indicating the lanes 
were going to merge," "did not indicate which lane ended." Petitioner's Brief, at 
2. ITD did not make a specific finding agreeing with Burton that the sign did not 
indicate which lane ended. Instead, ITD focused on Burton's responsibility to 
merge, stating: 
Officer Hilton observed the vehicle driven by Burton fail to use the 
vehicle's turn signals when merging from [her] lane of travel to 
another lane of travel as required by ldaho Code § 49-808(1). 
Decision at 4; Record at 48. ITD's finding is supported by Deputy Hilton's 
affidavit, which states: 
I observed a vehicle (license # 3B34991) fail to signal when it 
merged lanes. 
When I made contact with the driver, I advised her why I had 
stopped her. She stated . . . "I never signal when I merge lanes." 
Affidavit, at 1-2; Record at 3-4. ITD's finding is also supported by Burton's 
testimony at hearing, where Burton admitted the sign "showed the lanes 
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This result is consistent with State v. Dewbre, 133 ldaho 663, 991 P.2d 
388 ( ~ t . ~ p p .  I 9 ~ 9 ) ~  which held: 
The language of I.C. 5 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must 
be given effect. 
whenever a vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one 
lane splits into two lanes, or 'two lanes merge into one lane, an 
appropriate signal is required pursuant to I.C. g 49-808. 
Id. 133 ldaho at 666, 991 P.2d at 391. 
Finally, Burton contends, "Inclusion of the word 'appropriate' in the statute 
implies that there are situations in which the use of a signal is not appropriate." 
Reply at 6. Burton's interpretation might be valid if the statute required a signal 
"ir or "when" appropriate. Instead, the statue requires an "appropriate signal." 
The word "appropriate" is an adjective describing the type of signal required. In 
other words, the statute requires a signal, but not just any kind of signal. It 
requires the type of signal given be appropriate. For example, an appropriate 
signal for a leftward movement on a highway would be the activation of the left 
blinker, and an inappropriate signal for the same movement leftward would be 
the activation of the right blinker. Here, Burton gave no signal, appropriate or 
otherwise. Accordingly, it is clear that Burton failed to give an appropriate signal 
as contemplated by the statute, and this language is not unconstitutionally vague 
* It is noted that the result herein is consistent with Dewbre because, as that court stated, it did 
not consider the issue of whether the statue was unconstitutionally vague, as Dewbre had not 
raised it below. Id. 133 ldaho at 667, 991 P.2d at 392. 
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as applied to Burton. Again, this result: is consistent with Sfafe v. Dewbre, supra, 
which held: 
Dewbre further argues that no signal is the appropriate signal when 
the vehicle movement can be made with reasonably safety. The 
plain language of I.C. § 49-808 provides that an individual may 
"move right or left upon a highway" if two requirements are met: (1) 
if "the movement can be made with reasonable safety" and (2) if 
"an appropriate signal" is given. Even if a vehicle can be moved 
with reasonable safety, I.C. § 49-808 still requires the use of turn 
signals when making the movement to the right or left. 
Furthermore, the ldaho legislature specifically amended the turn 
signal law deleting the exception Dewbre argues. Prior to the 
amendment, the statute provided that an appropriate signal was 
only required "in the event any other traffic may be affected by such 
movement." 1953 ldaho Sess. Law 507. This exception was 
removed in 1977 by the ldaho legislature. 1977 ldaho Sess. Law 
370. Consequently, the legislature intended that turn signals be 
used when moving right or left on a highway regardless of whether 
other traffic may be affected or a vehicle is moving with reasonable 
safety. I agree with the district court that an appropriate signal 
requires "such a signal as would put others on notice of the driver's 
intention to make a turning movement, and that it was not the intent 
of the legislature to negate the requirement of signaling when 
making a turning movement." 
Id. 133 ldaho at 666-67, 991 P.2d at 391-92.3 
Burton has not shown that I.C. § 49-808, as applied to her conduct, failed 
to provide fair notice that her failure to signal was proscribed or failed to provide 
sufficient guidelines such that Officer Hilton had unbridled discretion in 
determining whether to stop her. Accordingly, I.C. § 49-808 is not 
3 Although Judge Schwartzman, in his concurring opinion in Dewbre, questioned whether any 
driver would be able to fully comply with traffic laws, he concluded: "[Sjince the officer had some 
objective measure of probable cause to believe that Dewbre violated the traffic code, the stop 
would now be constitutionally reasonable and justified." Id. 133 ldaho at 667, 991 P.2d at 392. 
Although, as advanced by Burton, Fifth District Magistrate Judge Ted Israel in State v. Dale, 
Blaine Co. case # CR-2007-783, disagreed with the ldaho Court of Appeals decision Dewbre, this 
court is bound to follow it to the extent that its rationale is applicable. See Record at 42-44. 
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unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton, and ITD's finding that Officer Wilton 
had legal cause to stop defendant for violating that statute is not in error. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: ITD's decision is affirmed. 
avt- 
DATED this /D  day of April, 2009. 
f l  AL 
FRED M. GIBLER, District Judge 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this /3 %day of April, 2009, to the following: 
James E. Siebe 
Siebe Law Offices 
202 E. Second St. 
P.O. Box 9045 
Moscow, ID 83843 
E?j Rami Amaro 
b Special Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 796 
Hayden, ID 83835 
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"< 
MICHELE REYNOLDS, Clerk of Court 
By: 
SUSAN K. SERVICK 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
6 1 & North 4' Street 
PO Box 2900 
Goeur d 'Alene, Idaho 83 8 16 
Phone: (208) 667-1486 
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NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF 
OUNSEL 
Respondent. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Susan K. Servick, Special Deputy Attorney 
General, does hereby appear and substitute as attorney for the Respondent, State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation, in the above-entitled matter. See Special Deputy Attorney 
General Appointment letter attached as Exhibit A. You are hereby notified that all papers 
to be served on the Respondent shall be served on: 
Susan K. Servick 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
61 8 North 4th Street 
PO Box 2900 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838 16 
Phone: 208-667- 1486 
Fax: 208-667-1825 
Dated A ~ r i l  10.2009. 
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Susan K. Servick 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that true and correct copies of the NOTICE OF SmSTITUTION were 
transmitted, April 10,2009 by the following method, to: 
James E. Siebe 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 9045 
Moscow, ID 83842 
J Fax 
- US Mail 
Fax: 208 882-8769 
Susan K. Servick 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION - 2 
STATE OF IDAHO 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
March 20,2009 
SPECIAL DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL APPOINTMENT 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Susan K. Servick, Attorney at Law, P. 0. Box 2900, Coeur d'Alene, ldaho 83816-2900, 
is hereby appointed Spedal Deputy Attorney General for the purpose of representing 
the State of ldaho in any appeal from a hearing officer's dedsion in ldaho 
Transportation Department District 1 filed pursuant to the authority of ldaho Code § 18- 
8002%. Automatic License Suspension Program. 
This letter of appointment will be included in the files of any court case, hearing, or other 
matter in which she represents the State of ldaho in these appeals. This appointment is 
effective through December 31,2009. 
Any courtesies you can extend to Ms. Servick in her conduct of business for the State of 
Idaho, as my delegate, will be appreciated. 
Sincerely. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400, FAX: (208) 854-8071 
Located at 700 W. State Street EXHIBIT A 
Joe R. Williams Building, 2nd Floor 
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BRITT COLLEEN BURTON, 1 
Petitioner, j 
VS. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, ) Case No. CV-2007-461 
Respondent. 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
BMTT COLLEEN BURTON, ) 
Appellant, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 




TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT (SPECIAL DEPUTY 
ATTORNEY GENERAL) AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
1. The above-named Appellant, BRITT COLLEEN BURTON, appeals 
against the Idaho Transportation Department, to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Idaho, from the final agency decision dated September 20, 2007, upholding 
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Ms. Burton's license suspension, and the District Court's Opinion and Order Re: 
Appeal, affirming the decision, entered by the Honorable Fred M. Gibler on April 10, 
2009 and served on appellant's counsel on April 13,2009. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Order 
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to 
I.A.R. 1 l(f). 
3. The preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which the appellant 
then intends to assert in the appeal is as follows: there was no lawful basis for the stop 
preceding the evidentiary test giving rise to the Administrative License Suspension 
imposed upon Appellant. 
However, pursuant to I.A.R. 17(f), this preliminary statement of the issue to be 
appealed does not prevent appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 
4. Appellant requests preparation of the Court Clerk's Record. Appellant 
will pay the balance of the fees for preparation upon receipt of said estimate. The 
necessary transcripts and record for the appeal to District Court have been prepared 
and Appellant has paid the fees for preparation thereof, and this matter was submitted 
without argument, so Appellant anticipates the record will be de minimis in size. 
5. Appellant requests that no additional documents be included in the 
clerk's record other than those automatically included under I.A.R. 28. 
6. Counsel certifies by his signature hereunder that service of this Notice 
of Appeal has been made upon the reporter of the Honorable Fred M. Gibler, District 
Judge, that the $100 estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid 
concurrently with the filing of this Notice, that counsel will mail the fee for 
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preparation of any transcript if ally such estimate is received, and that service has 
been made upon all other parties required to be served pursuant to I.A.R. 20. 
DATED this 22nd day of May, 2009. 
SIEBE LAW OFFICES 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of May, 2009,I served a true and correct 
copy of the f'aregoing document by the method indicated and addressed to the 
following: 
Susan K. Sewick ( ) U.S. Mail 
Special Deputy Attorney General ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2900 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Driver Services ( ) U.S. Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 ( p m i g h t  Mail 
Boise, ID 83707-1 129 ( Facsimile (208) 332-4 124 
Honorable Fred M. Gibler ( ) U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 527 ['d Delivered 
Wallace, ID 83873 ernight Mail 
( Facsimile (208) 753-358 1 
/- 
Byrl Cinnamon 
P.O. Box 2821 
Hayden, ID 83835 
( &.s. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAM 
BRITT C. BURTON, 
VS. ) SUPREME COURT N0.36540-2009 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT ) CLERKf S CERTIFICATE 
OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent/Respondent. ) 
I, CAROLN RYAN, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the 
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Benewah, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record in the 
above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and 
contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers 
designated to be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any 
Notice of Cross-Appeal, and any additional documents requested to be 
included. 
I further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and 
pictures offered or admitted as exhibits in the above entitled cause, if 
any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court with any 
Reporterf s Transcript and the Clerkf s Record (except for the exhibits 
which are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by 
Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
CLERKf S CERTIFICATE 
IN WITNESS WI-IEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
- + A  seal of said Court at St. Maries, Idaho this za day of June, 2009. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
J. MICHELE REYNOLDS 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BGNEWAH 
BRITT C. BURTON, ) 
) 
VS . ) SUPREME COURT N0.36540-2009 
\ 
I 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT ) CLERKf S CERTIFICATE 
OF TRANSPORTATION f ) OF EXHIBITS 
I, CAROL RYAN, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Benewah, do hereby certify: 
That the following is a list of exhibits to the Record that 
have been used as evidence in this cause: 
COURT'S EXHIBITS DESCRIPTION 
1 ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
THERE NO REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS LODGED IN THIS CASE. 
I do further certify that all exhibits in the above entitled 
cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with 
the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
CLERKf S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 1 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
J. MICHELE REYNOLDS 
Clerk of t h e  District  Court 
By: 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed postage 
pre-paid or by inter-office mail this A .$ ' h  day of June, 2009 to: 
JAMES E. SIEBE 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9045 
Moscow, ID 83843 
SUSAN K. SERVICK 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2900 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16 
J. MICHELE REYNOLDS 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: 
Deputy J 
